第144期岳麓经贸学术论坛预告

主  题：Does Relative Framing and Minimum Level IncreasePublic Good Contributions？

时  间：2018年9月30日（周日）14:30—16:00

地  点：湖南大学财院校区行政楼401报告厅

主讲人：王湘红（中国人民大学经济学院教授。1996年博士毕业于美国卡耐基梅隆大学。）

主讲简介

王湘红 中国人民大学经济学院教授。1996年博士毕业于美国卡耐基梅隆大学。曾在美国SAS研究有限公司和世界银行从事研究工作。主持多项国家自然科学基金面上项目。2014-2016年期间担任世界经济论坛全球战略委员会(Global Agenda Councils)行为分会委员。

论文发表在Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of EconomicPsychology，Journalof Comparative Economics,《世界经济》，《金融研究》等国际国内顶尖学术刊物上。主要研究兴趣包括用行为和实验经济学，公共政策，劳动经济学，消费行为等等。

内容简介

Individual contributions topublic goods can be framed in absolute amount or as a relative proportion ofone’s income. This paper examines the effect of such framing on contributionsof group members to a public good in a laboratory experiment. The framingeffect can be resulted from shifting of reference points or fairness awareness.In our experiment, members in a group have high and low two endowments typesand they play public good games both without and with minimum contributionlevels (MCLs). As a treatment, both the contribution metric and MCLs areexpressed either in absolute amount or as a relative proportion of a groupmember’s endowment. The MCL is different in absolute amount for the high andlow type members, but it is the same proportion of their endowments for the twotypes. The number of high endowment members also varies as a treatment to groupcomposition. We find some important results that are consistent with ourhypotheses. First, without MCL, the relative metric significantly reducescontributions, especially for the low types; the reduction also comes from morefree riders. Second, the introduction of MCL significantly increases contributions.Third, the relative framing of MCL increases contributions more than the absoluteMCL, therefore the difference between absolute condition and relative conditionalmost disappear after MCL is introduced. Fourth, the average group contributionis increased by the number of high type members in a group. We discuss theoriesand implications of these findings.

发表记录

Babcock, Linda;George Loewenstein and Xianghong Wang. 1995. "The Relationship between Uncertainty, the Contract Zone, andEfficiency in a Bargaining Experiment." Journal of Economic Behavior& Organization, 27(3), 475-85.

Babcock, Linda; Xianghong Wang and George Loewenstein. 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisonsin Negotiations that Reflect a Self-Serving Bias." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 1-19.

Wang, Xianghong. 2009. "Retail Return Policy, Endowment Effect, and ConsumptionPropensity: An Experimental Study." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis& Policy, 9(1), 38-38.

Wang, Xianghong. 2012. "When Workers Do Not Know – the Behavioral Effects of MinimumWage Laws Revisited." Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(5),951-62.

Nie, Huihua; Minjie Jiang and Xianghong Wang. 2013. "The Impact of Political Cycle: Evidence fromCoalmine Accidents in China." Journal of Comparative Economics,41(4), 995-1011.

Kocher, Martin G.; Peter Martinsson; Emil Persson andXianghong Wang. 2016. "Is There a HiddenCost of Imposing a Minimum Contribution Level for Public GoodContributions?" Journal of Economic Psychology, 56, 74-84.

王湘红, 孙文凯, 任继球. 相对收入对外出务工的影响:来自中国农村的证据[J]. 世界经济,2012(5):121-141.

王湘红, 陈坚. 社会比较和相对收入对农民工家庭消费的影响——基于RUMiC数据的分析[J]. 金融研究,2016(12):48-62.